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Invisible Victims: 
A Comparison of Susan Glaspell's 
Jury of Her Peers, and Herman 
Melville's Bartleby the Scrivener 
Robin West 
Somehow, by some process, some of the pains and suffering we sus-
tain in life become cognizable legal injuries: if we are hurt through the 
defamatory utterances of others, we might seek compensation; if we suf-
fer a whiplash in an automobile accident when we're rear-ended on the 
road, we might seek compensation for the pain we're put in; if we lose 
profits we might have made but for the interference of some third party 
with a contract we've entered, we might recover that loss. Other pains, 
although concededly injurious, and even concededly "caused" by some 
blameworthy individual or entity, are not cognizable: perhaps because 
they are too trivial, or too easily faked, or because they happened too long 
ago, or for any number of other reasons, the societal costs of fashioning a 
remedy exceed the benefits to the injured individual of recognizing one. 
Still others are also concededly injurious, but nevertheless not cognizable 
because they were not in fact caused by a culpable individual: the pain of 
grieving the non-negligently caused death of a beloved, or the pain inflict-
ed by the strike of lightning or some other "Act of God," are such pains. 
Toward all of this uncompensated suffering, the law stands, so to speak, 
respectfully mute: although not compensated, the pain of grief, or of 
lightning, is at any rate not denied. 
There is, however, another type of suffering - another "category" of 
harms - toward which the law stands in a quite different relationship. As 
a number of critical legal scholars have argued, some of the sufferings of 
daily life - some of the harms individually sustained - are not simply 
not compensated by our positive law, but their very existence is aggres-
sively denied, trivialized, disguised or legitimated by our legal rhetoric. I 
These harms tend, not coincidentally, to be the byproduct of institu-
tions, social systems, and structures of belief which overwhelming serve 
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the interests of powerful individuals, groups or subcommunities. 
Although law does not cause these harms it is complicit in the process by 
which they become "legitimate" - an accepted part of the terrain of daily 
living - and hence become invisible, often even to the individuals who 
sustain them. Particularly from a perspective internal to the legal system, 
such harms can be extremely hard to discern. 
For some time now, it has been the contention of at least some prac-
titioners of the "law and literature movement" that narrative literature 
may be one means by which the contours and dimensions of the subjec-
tive experience of persons regulated and governed by law become articu-
lated. If so, and if the critical scholars are correct in arguing that a part of 
our subjective experience is of harms legitimated and thereby made invis-
ible by legal rhetoric, then it seems that one use to which narrative liter-
ature might be put, is to "give voice" to the victims of "invisible harms" 
legitimated by law. And in fact, at least one prominent law and literature 
scholar heavily influenced by the critical legal studies movement - Brook 
Thomas - argues for precisely such a thesis in his seminal study on 19th 
century American fiction, Cross Examinatiom of Law and Literature: 
Cooper, Hawthorne, Stowe and Melville. 2 In that work, Thomas argues per-
suasively that all four of these prominent literary figures explored in their 
fiction the suffering of persons hurt by various social hierarchies, and the 
complicity of law in legitimating and masking that pain. 
In this article, I hope to take this Thomasian claim one step further. 
I will argue that two short novellas, Herman Melville's "Bartleby the 
Scrivener"3 - which Thomas does discuss4 - and Susan Glaspell's "A 
Jury of Her Peers"5 - which he does not - not only seek to aniculate 
and give voice to the victims of such legitimated harms in the way 
Thomas suggests, but that they also quite directly concern the process of 
legitimation itself.Thus, legitimation, as well as the invisible pains that are 
legitimated, is the subject matter of both stories. Both stories do indeed 
aim to make more visible the suffering of two groups of people in classi-
cally liberal societies: in "Barcleby," employees in certain kinds of labor 
markets, who bear the brunt of the pain of alienating and commodifying 
the products of labor, and in "Jury of Her Peers," wives in traditional, 
patriarchal marriages, who bear the weight of the institutionalized loneli-
ness, abuse and injustice that such marriages often entail. But this expo-
sure of otherwise hidden suffering is not all these stories do: both novel-
204 
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 205 1996
las are also centrally and undeniably concerned with legal process. They 
are clearly about law, as much as they are about labor markets or patri-
archy. And yet, neither story offers a clear-cut indictment of law. Neither 
story portrays law - or even a legal actor - as the cause of the suffering 
they describe. Yet law is obviously complicit in the suffering of both 
Bardeby, in Melville's tale, and Minnie Foster, in Glaspell's. What both 
novellas, each written by astute and critical professional legal observers, 
aim to show is the way in which law masks or obfuscates this suffering. 
Both novellas, in short, aim to depict the "process oflegitimation." 
In neither case, however, is the process of legitimation a simple one. 
The law does not stamp these institutions, and the suffering they prompt, 
with a good housekeeping seal of approval, to which all involved parties 
quiedy nod in acquiescence. Rather, in both cases, the law, through non-
interference as well as positive acts, creates a private "space" within which 
the strong can dominate the weak free of the threat of state or community 
intervention, and within which the only check on such domination is either 
the moral conscience of the strong, or some sort of concerted political 
action of the weak. In both cases, there are significant obstacles to either of 
these checks being exercised, the most important of which, arguably, is ide-
ological: as both novellas make clear, the "individual" wage worker, employ-
er, wife and husband are characterized within each societal context in such 
a way as to render either a political response by the weak, or a moral act by 
the strong, unlikely. Legal rhetoric as well as positive law contribute, and 
mightily, to that characterization. As a result, the misery felt within these 
private relationships and private spaces proceeds unabated. 
The first part of this essay takes up Melville's "Bardeby the Scrivener," 
and the second concerns Glaspell's "Jury of Her Peers." In each part, I will 
first examine the institution depicted in the novella, with a focus on the 
social construction of the "individual" which thereby emerges, and then 
on the injury, or simply the suffering, each institution entails and which 
each story depicts. I then look in each case at the process of legitimation. 
In the conclusion I will comment briefly on the lessons these stories 
might impart with regard to our own peculiarly modern, and even post-
modern, habits of thought and action. 
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L Bartleby the Scrivener 
The plot of Melville's "Banleby the Scrivener" can be readily summa-
rized. The narrator of the story is a lawyer "of Wall Street" in the 1850s, 
who, in response to an increase in his business, finds himself in need of 
an additional copyist, or scrivener. After placing an ad, the narrator hires 
the first to respond: a despondent, pale, gauntly creature named Bartleby. 
Although even from the outset clearly eccentric in appearance and taste, 
Bartleby is initially a good worker - a careful, quiet, copyist with whom 
the lawyer has no complaints. The narrator in fact commends his pro-
ductivity: 
At first Banleby did an extraordinary quantity of writing. 
As if long famishing for something to copy, he seemed to 
gorge himself on my documents. There was no pause for 
digestion. He ran a day and night line, copying by sun-
light and by candle-light. I should have been quite delight-
ed with his application, had he been cheerfully industri-
ous. But he wrote on silently, palely, mechanically. 6 
In a very short time, however, Bartleby becomes uncooperative. He 
initially refuses to take on all assigned tasks other than the copying itself, 
(such as proofreading) saying simply and repeatedly that "he prefers not 
to," in response to all requests. Even more galling, it becomes clear to the 
employer that Bartleby has no place of residence, and is in fact living in 
the law office. Eventually Bartleby announces that he will do no copying 
as well, and in fact, that he "prefers not to" do any work at all. Bartleby 
does nothing but stand mute and expressionless, all day long, in the mid-
dle of the office. Understandably, this situation eventually becomes intol-
erable to his employer. Although tolerant of Bartleby's eccentricities, and 
even sympathetic to his plight, the lawyer, who is described throughout 
the book as above all a prudent man, cannot abide the presence of a 
ghost-like figure in his law office who does literally no work and never 
leaves the premises. The lawyer tries to convince Bartleby to leave, and 
offers him severance pay to facilitate his departure. But Bartleby prefers 
not to go. The narrator, an amiable and likeable figure, is unable to bring 
himself to call the police and have him physically hauled off the premis-
es. In desperation, the narrator responds to the dilemma by literally mov-
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ing his office - thus leaving Bartleby standing mute, expressionless and 
unmoving in the empty office suite. Eventually the narrator receives word 
that Bartleby, after refusing to leave the office building, has been arrested 
for vagrancy at the insistence of the new, bewildered tenant, and placed 
in the city "Tombs." Moved by charity and humanitarian impulse, the 
narrator visits him there, twice. On the second visit he learns that 
Bartleby has refused to take all offers of food, and has starved himself to 
death. 
Whatever else this enigmatic story may be "about"; it is most assured-
ly about an employment relationship between a lawyer and a scrivener, 
and in a highly particularized context. Indeed, Melville subtitles his story 
A story ofWall Street, and the subtitle is significant. The lawyer-narrator of 
Bartleby's story is not just any lawyer, he is a Wall Street lawyer, who does, 
in his own words, "in the cool tranquillity of a snug retreat, [a] snug busi-
ness among rich men's bonds and mortgages and title-deeds."7 We are also 
told by the lawyer, in a brief aside which has proven to be of interest to 
legally sophisticated critics, that "The good old office, now extinct, in the 
State of New York, of a Master of Chancery, had been conferred upon me. 
lt was not a very arduous office, but very pleasantly remunerative."8 We 
should not, though, confuse the equitable tilt of Chancery for a similar 
inclination in the narrator, as his next comment makes clear: 
I seldom lose my temper; much more seldom indulge in 
dangerous indignation at wrongs and outrages; but I 
must be permitted to be rash here and declare, that I con-
sider the sudden and violent abrogation of the office of 
Master in Chancery, by the new Constitution, as a -
premature act; inasmuch as I had counted upon a life-
lease of the profits, whereas I only received those of a few 
short years. But this is by the way.9 
The "rich men" whose exchanges of property provide the narrator with 
a livelihood, however, remain in the background throughout the story. We 
never see or hear them. Indeed, even the narrator's own work - the reduc-
tion, through law, of "property" into verbal formula, so as to facilitate their 
exchange and conversion into profit - remains in the background. What 
this "story of Wall Street" is about, at least on first blush, is not the bonds 
and mortgages themselves, {and much less, the holders of the bonds and 
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mortgages) but the individuals charged with the mechanical aspects of the 
work required to produce those bonds and mortgages: the scriveners who 
copy, and re-copy, and re-copy, in longhand, the requisite documents, 
some of them hundreds of pages long. The narrator himself makes the sub-
ject matter clear in the opening paragraph: 
I am a rather elderly man. The nature of my avocations 
for the last thirty years has brought me into more than 
ordinary contact with what would seem an interesting 
and somewhat singular set of men, of whom as yet noth-
ing that I know of has ever been written: - I mean the 
law-copyists or scriveners. I have known very many of 
them, professionally and privately, and if I pleased, could 
relate divers histories, at which good natured gentlemen 
might smile, and sentimental souls might weep. But I 
waive the biographies of all other scriveners for a few pas-
sages in the life of Bartleby, who was a scrivener the 
strangest I ever saw or heard of 10 
The work of the "mere copying" as opposed to the "original drawing 
up of the legal documents" is unenviable. In one passage, the narrator 
explains: 
It is, of course, an indispensable part of a scrivener's busi-
ness to verify the accuracy of his copy, word by word. 
Where there are two or more scriveners in an office, they 
assist each other in this examination, one reading from 
the copy, the other holding the original. It is a very dull, 
wearisome, and lethargic affair. I can readily imagine that 
to some sanguine temperaments it would be altogether 
intolerable. For example, I cannot credit that the mettle-
some poet Byron would have contentedly sat down with 
Bartleby to examine a law document of, say, five hundred 
pages, closely written in a crimpy hand. ll 
It is, of course, not only Byron who would find the work intolerable. 
Bartleby himself eventually "prefers not" to do it. Indeed, it is hard to 
think of a more deadening, spirit-murdering, employment of language 
than the task of copying out, longhand and in quad-duplicate, hundred-
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page-plus deeds of trust, mortgages and bonds. The copied word is the 
antithesis of the creatively spoken utterance which, at least according to 
any number of linguists, is the defining attribute of biological human life. 
The work of copying words, which themselves reduce nature to profit, 
might be seen to be thus doubly or even triply alienating: the natural 
human instinct to play creatively with language, the creative relationship 
of the individual to the natural world through work, and the natural 
world itself, are all alienated by the commodifying and tedious process of 
reducing, through copied words, nature to property, and property to secu-
rity for loans, and loans to profits. 
In a moment I will focus on the various injuries, both physical and 
spiritual, suggested by this sort of employment. Preliminarily, however, it 
is worth noting that Melville supplies at the end of the novella a telling 
metaphor for the very idea of frustrated, futile, impotent, and indeed 
"dead" communication. In an addendum to the main story, the narrator 
explains a rumor heard about the mysterious Bartleby, to wit, that 
Bartleby, prior to his employment as a scrivener, had worked in the "Dead 
Letter Office" in Washington D.C. The image of Bartleby sorting and 
destroying dead letter prompts from the narrator a curious and confused 
pasSion: 
The report was this: that Bartleby had been a subordinate 
clerk in the Dead Letter Office at Washington, from 
which he had been suddenly removed by a change in the 
administration. When I think over this rumor I cannot 
adequately express the emotions which seize me. Dead 
letters! Does it not sound like dead men? Conceive a man 
by nature and misfortune prone to a pallid hopelessness: 
can any business seem more fitted to heighten it than 
that of continually handling these dead letters, and 
assorting them for the flames? For by the cartload they 
are annually burned. Sometimes from out the folded 
paper the pale clerk takes a ring: the finger it was meant 
for, perhaps, moulders in the grave; a bank note sent in 
swiftest charity: he whom it would relieve, nor eats nor 
hungers any more; pardon for those who died despairing; 
hope for those who died unhoping; good tidings for 
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those who died stifled by unrelieved calamities. On 
errands of life, these letters speed to death. 
Ah Bartleby! Ah HumanityP2 
The Dead Letter rumor, however, is a rumor, and an afterthought to 
the story. In the main, the story is about Bartleby's work as a scrivener, not 
a postal clerk. Now the point - the raison d'etre - of the contract of 
employment between the narrator and Bardeby, of course, is to produce 
copied words - many of them, and without mistake. At the heart of this 
relationship, as at the heart of all relationships of employment, is an 
imperative of what might be called "free productivity." For the employee 
to continue to be an employee, he must be, by his own free choice, pro-
ductive. What he must be is freely productive. Putting it differendy, what 
it means to be an individual within these relationships is to be productive. 
When the employee ceases to be productive he ceases to be. It is his pro-
ductivity - not his biological and certainly not his social identity - that 
defines his essence. 
The point is underscored repeatedly by Melville's descriptions of 
Bardeby, the unproductive scrivener. As Bartleby becomes increasingly 
unproductive, he becomes increasingly, in the narrator's eyes, "cadaver-
ous." When the narrator first employs Bartleby, he is described as "pallid-
ly neat, pitiably respectable, [and] incurably forlorn"13 - but not death-
ly. His productivity, as noted above, is praised, and it is praised in organ-
ic terms as ravenous: he "gorged himself" on documents, with "no pause 
for digestion."14 It is only when he begins to refuse to work, that the tone 
of these descriptions shifts toward the macabre. When Bartleby first 
begins to refuse to work, he is compared by the narrator to the bust of 
Cicero that decoratively adorns the office. IS When he eventually refuses to 
leave the office, he is first compared to a millstone around the narrator's 
neck,16 and then later to the "last column of a ruined temple."17 By the 
point at which he refuses all work, he is described, and repeatedly, as 
cadaverous. 18 Before he actually dies in the Tombs, he has become dead in 
the office. As his freely chosen "preference," in response to requests to 
produce, is "not to" he becomes organic - but dead - matter. He is of 
human substance, but that is all- his formal humanity is negated by his 
unproductivity. 
What this employee becomes, when he becomes unproductive, is 
210 
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 211 1996
nothing but a repository of organic need. He needs shelter, which he takes 
from the lawyer's office space, and he needs food, which he buys from his 
savings squirreled away in his desk cubbyhole. This neediness, coupled 
with his unproductivity, makes him infantile, and toward the end, the 
narrator does in desperation offer to take him home to simply care for 
him - an offer which Bartleby prefers to refuse. 19 But Bartleby does not 
become, in the eyes of the narrator or anyone else, particularly innocent, 
or even animalistic. & he becomes nothing but his biological, organic 
needs, he becomes, rather, increasingly deathlike. To the reader, his actu-
al biological death, freely chosen, at the end of the story, seems inevitable, 
and even anti-climactic. 
By steadily shedding himself of them, Bartleby thus places in relief 
both prongs of the definition of the individual at the heart of contractu-
al employment: free agency and productivity. Let me take them one at a 
time. First, as Brook Thomas has ably argued in his study of Melville's 
legal fiction, the laissez faire assumption of free agency at the heart of das-
sicalliberalism's conception of the labor contract is directly challenged by 
the portrayal of Banleby and his employer, both of whom seem to be 
utterly constrained by the economic circumstances in which they find 
themselves.20 In fact, although Thomas doesn't note it, the narrator him-
se/fremarks upon the sheer oddity of one of the central conceits of the pic-
ture of freedom assumed by liberalism's conception of the labor contract, 
to wit, the notion of a deal for labor as meaningfully manifesting "prefer-
ences" of the free individuals that enter into them. In a prescient passage 
which speaks directly to a striking feature of contemporary legal and eco-
nomic discourse, the narrator and his employees comment on the perver-
sity of using the verb "to prefer" in all sorts of inappropriate contexts: 
"Say now that in a day or two you will begin to be a lit-
tle reasonable: - say so, Bartleby." 
"At present I would prefer not to be a little reason-
able," was his mildly cadaverous reply. 
Just then the folding-doors opened, and Nippers 
approached. . .. He overheard these final words of 
Bartleby. 
"Prefer not, eh? gritted Nippers - ''I'd prefer him, if 
I were you, sir," ... What is it sir, pray, that he prefers not 
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to do now?" 
Bartleby moved not a limb. 
"Mr. Nippers," said I, ''I'd prefer that you would 
withdraw for the present." 
Somehow, of late, I had got into the way of involun-
tarily using this word "prefer" upon all sorts of not exact-
ly suitable occasions. And I trembled to think that my 
contract with the scrivener had already and seriously 
affected me in a mental way. And what further and deep-
er aberration might it not yet produce? This apprehen-
sion had not been without efficacy in determining me to 
summary means. 
As Nippers ... was departing, Turkey ... blandly 
approached .... 
"[A]bout Barcleby, I think that if he would but pre-
fer to take a quart of good ale every day, it would do 
much towards mending him, and enabling him to assist 
in examining his papers." 
"So you have got the word, too" said I, slightly excited. 
"With submission, what word, sir?" asked Turkey ... 
"I would prefer to be left alone here" said Bartleby, as 
if offended at being mobbed in his privacy. 
"That's the word Turkey," said I, "that's it." 
u~h, prefer?" oh, yes, - queer word. I never use it 
myself But sir, as I was saying, if he would but prefer -" 
"Turkey," interrupted I, "you will please withdraw." 
u~h, certainly sir, if you prefer that I should."21 
It is not, however, only the purponed free agency of the labor con-
tract that is thrown into question by Banleby's extreme malady. The 
obsession with productivity is as well. What defines the employment rela-
tionship, which is itself of course both defining and necessary to the 
employee's life, is production; biological and social needs are incidental, 
and noteworthy only as they impact upon production. Banleby's meta-
morphosis highlights this in a negative sense: over the course of the story 
he deadens as he refuses to produce copy. But Melville also describes the 
process positively: the lawyer does indeed notice the temperament, the 
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diet, the ages, and the ambitions of all of his copyists - not only Banleby 
- but he notices them distinctively in the context of their impact on 
their rate of production. Although engaging, humorous, sympathetically 
drawn, and introspective, the narrator is steadfast in his pursuit of profit 
through the commodified, and commodifying, word. His bantering and 
good natured interaction with his copyists - at least until Banleby forces 
him into a crisis of conscience - is entirely directed toward that end. 
A. The Injury 
Bartleby's work - the job of the scrivener in the law office - is sure-
ly injurious - physically, mentally and spiritually. Yet, even left-wing 
critics are loathe to suggest that the injury inflicted by this son of employ-
ment upon the bodies and minds of office workers is in any way what this 
story is actually about - such an interpretation seems to diminish the 
work, as well as ignore its peculiarities. Brook Thomas's reading, noted 
above, and heavily influenced by Morton Horwitz's history of the com-
mon law during the 19th century, certainly comes closest: Thomas reads 
"Bartleby" as largely about, and critical of, the myth of free agency in the 
laissez faire ideology of contract so prevalent in mid-19th century law.22 
But even Thomas stops short of the most political, albeit most literalles-
son one can possibly draw from this story, which is that the work of being 
a scrivener in a Wall Street law office is both injurious and profoundly 
alienating. Clearly anxious not to have his interpretation reduce Melville 
to the status of being an agitator for improved working conditions in 
offices,2' but just as anxious to insist that the story is indeed about the 
alienation of labor, Thomas argues that we should understand the char-
acter Bartleby as essentially a stand-in, or representative, of an "under-
world" of oppressed workers, knowledge of the existence of which both 
the narrator and his rich clients must quite actively repress, if they are to 
continue comfortably with their "snug business" on Wall Street.24 By read-
ing Bartleby as a stand-in for oppressed workers from all sorts of indus-
tries, Thomas can then read the story as containing an implicit condem-
nation of the handful of doctrinal developments in the common law 
which were contemporaneous with the story's setting, and which did 
indeed dramatically undermine the position of workers badly injured on 
the job, and correspondingly benefited the interests of capital during the 
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industrial revolution: most notably the fellow-servant rule,25 but also, as 
Thomas argues, the doctrine of charity,l6 and abolition of the "office of 
equity."27Jt also, of course, frees Thomas of the need to describe the work 
Bartleby actually does - copy words in an office - as particularly alien-
ating, or particularly injurious (or particularly anything). His status as 
wage-laborer suffices to confer upon him his role as representative of the 
working class. 
By his own account, Thomas is moved to this abstraction - Bartleby 
as representative of a larger class of oppressed workers - in part because 
of his discomfort with the constraints of the story. Most notably, Thomas 
seemingly agrees with his critics that there don't seem to be any work-relat-
ed injuries in Bartleby anyway, and surely no compensation which would 
have been barred by the fellow-servant rule.28 In fact, Thomas suggests, 
there's little from which Bartleby suffers that would have been compens-
able under either the more paternalistic rules of the pre-classical contracts 
era, or the more regulated regime of the 20th century workplace. Viewing 
Bartleby as a stand-in for a class of workers, of course, removes this inter-
pretive difficulty: even if he doesn't suffer from uncompensated injuries, he 
is a stand-in for other (more dramatically) maimed and oppressed factory 
workers, who clearly do suffer such injuries, and very likely would have 
been compensated for them, either before or after the heyday of laissez 
faire ideology which Thomas reads as the real target of the story. Thus, -
the need to abstract: Bartleby is about wage labor, not office work.29 The 
reading he's left with - that Bartleby represents a class of unseen 
oppressed workers, knowledge of the existence of which the narrator and 
his capitalist rich clients must deny, to maintain their own moral equa-
nimity - is a perfectly sensible one: there's plenty in the story to support 
it. But there are at least two problems with it. 
The first is simply interpretive: it d<:nies the specificity and the detail 
of Melville's narrative. I will return to this problem with Thomas's read-
ing in greater detail in the next section below. The second, and more fun-
damental problem is that the strained abstraction away from office labor 
to the class of laborers, in order to preserve the utility of the story as a' 
parable of wage labor alienation, is based on a false premise, and hence is 
simply not necessary. The office work Bartleby is required to do is plenty 
injurious and alienating. There's no need to think of it as representative 
of more truly harmful and oppressive labor. 
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What are those injuries? First of all, although not central to the 
action, it is certainly worth pointing out that Thomas and his critics are 
simply wrong in assuming that whatever suffering Bartleby and his col-
leagues endure, none of it can be traced to injuries which were or might 
be compensable by decent legal institutions. In fact, there are at least two 
injuries, quite physical and dearly work-related, that are referenced in the 
short novel, both of which might be compensable under either a pater-
nalistic pre-laissez faire regime like the sort that pre-dated the classical era 
or under a "regulatory" regime like that which followed it. Thus, in 
describing the junior copyist, Nippers, at the beginning of the story, the 
narrator explains: 
[His] indigestion seemed betokened in an occasional ner-
vous testiness and grinning irritability, ... and especially 
by a continual discontent with the height of the table 
where he worked. Though of a very ingenious mechani-
cal turn, Nippers could never get this table to suit him. 
He put chips under it, blocks of various sorts, bits of 
pasteboard, and at last went so far as to attempt an 
exquisite adjustment by final pieces of folded blotting 
paper. But no invention would answer. If, for the sake of 
easing his back, he brought the table lid at a sharp angle 
well up toward his chin, and wrote there like a man using 
the steep roof of a Dutch house for his desk - then he 
declared that it stopped the circulation in his arms. If 
now he lowered the table to his waistbands, and stooped 
over it in writing, then there was a sore aching in his 
back. In short, the truth of the matter was, Nippers knew 
not what he wanted. Or, if he wanted anything, it was to 
be rid of a scrivener's table altogether. 30 
It may be that Nippers' discomfort, as the narrator insists, is rooted 
in his unappealing ambition to rise above the status of being a mere 
scrivener, and usurp the work of the lawyer in the "original creation" of 
the mortgages and bonds which he can but copy. Or, it might be that his 
discomfort, his back pain, and the poor circulation in his arms were all 
quite real, and symptoms of Karpal's Tunnel Syndrome. If so, Nippers was 
right - adjusting the angle and height of the scrivener's table was as dose 
215 
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 216 1996
as he would come to resolving the problem, and minimizing this unam-
biguous work-related injury. 
Second, when Bartleby first ,refuses to do any writing, the narrator 
intimates yet a second injury: 
The next day I noticed that Bartleby did nothing but 
stand at his window in his dead-wall revery. Upon asking 
him why he did not write, he said that he had decided 
upon doing no more writing. 
"Why, how now? What next?" exclaimed I, "do no 
more writing?" 
"No more." 
"And what is the reason?" 
"Do you not see the reason yourself?" 
I looked steadfastly at him, and perceived that his 
eyes looked dull and glazed. Instantly it occurred to me, 
that his unexampled diligence in copying by his dim win-
dow for the first few weeks of his stay with me might 
have temporarily impaired his vision. 
***** 
[A]dded days went by. Whether Bartleby's eyes improved 
or not, I could not say .... At all events, he would do no 
more copying.31 
There is no shortage of work-related injuries in this Wall Street law 
office. There is accordingly no need to extrapolate from the office to the 
factory to read Bartlebyas an indictment of the uncompensated injuries 
occasioned by wage labor in a laissez faire economy. 
Of course, Thomas and his critics are right to suspect that the crisis 
of conscience which ultimately is the result of Bartleby's presence in this 
law office is not a function of these uncompensated work-related injuries. 
Thomas is wrong, though, to conclude from this that Bartleby must 
therefore be representative of a class of more seriously oppressed factory 
workers. Rather, what Bartleby's unproductive presence brings to the fore 
is the injurious nature of the work itself, and that injury Thomas's reading 
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of Bartleby as a working class representative curiously masks. Bartleby 
forces upon us direct knowledge of the unpalatability of the choice the 
labor contract has imposed upon him, and it is a choice the unpalatabili-
ty of which would certainly survive the transition away from the laissez 
faire assumptions of the classical era to the more regulated work environ-
ment of the 20th century: Bartleby must either be forcibly removed from 
the premises, in which case he will apparently starve, or he must be pro-
ductive. The first choice starkly reveals the barbarism of the disingenu-
ously equal and free contract of labor: the choice to work or not work is 
not much of a choice, where the alternative to labor is death. Again, 
where the essence of the individual is his productivity, rather than his bio-
logical or social self, his non-productivity reduces him to biological need, 
and if his wage is his only means of satiating those needs, then to death. 
But the second choice as well - the choice of free productivity in the 
office - is also unpalatable, and this unpalatability, no less than its bar-
barous alternative, is, at least in part, the subject matter of this most pecu-
liar tale. Again - the work itse/fis injurious. Rather than burning "dead 
letters" which were on "missions of life," as he had done in the Dead 
Letter Office, Bartleby, as a scrivener, produces dead letters on a mission 
of death - the commodification, through the mechanical production of 
deeds, mortgages, and "rich men's" trusts, of language, work, property, 
nature, and life itself Through a series of metaphors, Melville makes clear 
that while the alternative is literal death, the work required of this scriven-
er is indeed a kind of "living death": the work preserves biological life, but 
without sustaining it. The office itself, the narrator tells us, resembles just 
such a preservative container, more than a site for life: 
My chambers were upstairs at No -- Wall Street. At 
one end they looked upon the white wall of the interior 
of a spacious sky-light shaft, penetrating the building 
from top to bottom. This view ... [was] deficient in what 
landscape painters call "life." But if so, the view from the 
other end of my chambers offered, at least, a contrast, if 
nothing more. In that direction my windows command-
ed an unobstructed view of a lofty brick wall, black by 
age and everlasting shade; which wall. .. for the benefit of 
all near-sighted spectators, was pushed up to within ten 
217 
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 218 1996
feet of my window panes. Owing to the great height of 
: the surrounding buildings, and my chambers being on 
the second floor, the interval between this wall and mine 
not a little resembled a huge square cisternY 
The space in this office assigned to Bartleby is even more coffin-like: 
I resolved to assign Bartleby a corner by the folding-
doors.. .. I placed his desk close up to a small side-win-
dow in that part of the room, a window which originally 
had afforded a lateral view of certain grimy back-yards 
and bricks, but which, owing to subsequent erections, 
commanded at present no view at all, though it gave 
some light. Within three feet of the panes was a wall, and 
the light came down from far above, between two lofty 
buildings, as from a very small opening in a dome. Still 
further to a satisfactory arrangement, I procured a high 
green folding screen, which might entirely isolate Bartlby 
from my sight, though not remove him from my voice.33 
The brick wall that bars any further view out the windows of the 
office is routinely referred to by the narrator as the "dead wall," particu-
larly when it is the object of Bartleby's gaze. The confining, coffin-like 
architecture of the office is finally echoed in the end, in the narrator's 
description of the "Tombs," or prison, to which Bartleby is dispatched: 
Being under no disgraceful charge, and quite serene and 
harmless in all his ways, they had permitted him freely to 
wander about the prison, and especially in the inclosed 
grass-platted yards thereof And so I found him there, 
standing all alone in the quietest of the yards, his face 
toward a high wall - while all around, from the narrow 
slits of the jail windows, I thought I saw peering out 
upon him the eyes of murderers and thieves.34 
Banleby's free choice, then, is between imprisonment as a vagrant or 
biological death in the elements, or sustained, preserved life in a cistern 
in which he produces copied words which both describe and themselves 
constitute the properties and profits of others. It is a barbaric set of 
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options. Those who sanely and rationally choose to produce dead letters 
in a coffin like office, rather than risk death or imprisonment, do so at the 
cost of a tremendous amount of suffering. "Bartle by" makes the true 
nature of the choice, and hence the suffering it entails, starkly visible. 
B. Legiti11Ultion 
It has for some time now been the contention of the critical legal 
studies movement that law perpetuates hierarchical social and economic 
relations, and the suffering they cause, in at least two ways: first, by brute 
force, and second, by influencing the consciousness of both the empow-
ered and the weak. Melville's "Bartleby" explores both. First, the narrator 
gives voice to the limits of Bartleby's rights, which, when reached, justify 
the law's forceful intervention. Either the possession of private property, 
or the provision oflabor, confer legal rights. In the absence of either, there 
simply is no legally recognized entitlement to shelter: 
"Will you, or will you not, quit me?" I now demanded in 
sudden passion, advancing close to him. 
"I would prefer not to quit you," he replied, gently 
emphasizing the not. 
"What earthly right have you to stay here? Do you 
pay any rent? Do you pay my taxes? Or is this property 
~" yours. 
He answered nothing. 
''Are you ready to go on and write now? Are your eyes 
recovered? Could you copy a small paper for me this 
morning? or help examine a few lines? or step round to 
the Post Office? In a word, will you do any thing at all, to 
give a colouring to your refusal to depart the premises?"35 
Without a legal right to have basic needs met, the individual is left to 
the vagaries of private charity, or to fend for himself against nature. It is 
obviously by virtue of that harsh and immediate consequence of positive 
law that the inequalities in labor contracts self-perpetuate. Law quite lit-
erally enforces the inequalities engendered by these economic exchanges. 
The enforcement of positive law, however, although necessary, is not 
sufficient to account for the phenomenal degree of compliance with law 
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that distinguishes liberal legal societies, or at least it has been the distin-
guishing and persistent claim of the Gramscian wing of the critical legal 
studies movement to so maintain. Rather, what accompanies the applica-
tion of force, and together sufficiently accounts for compliance, is the cre-
ation, through rhetoric, of a consciousness, or a frame of mind, or a set 
of beliefs, within which the weak feel that they are freely complying, and 
therefore that their choices manifest and evidence their autonomy, and 
the strong feel justified in their positions of privilege. The complicity of 
law in the creation of this state of consciousness is partial and indirect. 
The narrative, expository, normative, rhetorical part of law - not the 
guns and prisons, but the words, the holdings, and the stories - is but a 
part of a larger cultural apparatus. It is that cultural apparatus which over-
whelmingly and at times unwittingly constructs individuality and indi-
vidual consciousness in such a way as to render compliance seemingly 
natural and free, on the part of the weak, and morally unproblemmatic, 
on the part of the strong. 
Melville's "Barcleby" dramatizes both ends of this process of legitima-
tion. First, as suggested above, by the prescient insistent use of the verb 
prefer, Bartleby's suicide is marked as consensual, just as is the choice of . 
the other copyists to produce rather than starve. To prefer is to express a 
choice, and to express a choice is to do so freely; hence both Bartleby and 
his colleagues' fates are chosen rather than duressed. In fact, Melville is 
insistent that all we know of Bartleby is that he makes these odd choices; 
we are on several occasions reminded that the narrator lacks all knowledge 
of Barcleby's history. 
The protagonist of this story, however, is clearly not the enigmatic 
Bartleby, of whom we know truly nothing other than that he prefers not 
to produce (until the end, when we learn of his prior work in the Dead 
Letter Office). Rather, the protagonist is the narrator, and of the narrator, 
we learn a great deal. This story of Wall Street is at bottom a story of the 
self-justification of privilege within a liberal market economy. In the 
absence of any legal claim to entitlement, Barcleby is at the mercy of the 
narrator's charity. Whatever course he takes, the narrator must deal with 
Bartleby in a non-contractual, and therefore unscripted, manner; this 
above all else prudent lawyer must somehow come to grips with a non-
productive, seemingly irrational and eventually quite disruptive presence 
in his law office. The narrator must somehow justify either his decision to 
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support Bartleby in spite of his non-productivity, or justify his decision to 
abandon him. 
Over the course of the novella, the narrator explores a number of such 
justifications, and by so doing eventually develops a quite intricate 
"empathic calculus" to suit the decision of the moment. Those various 
self-justifications constitute, collectively, a compelling and even exhaus-
tive account of the many ways in which economic privilege is still 
squared, today, with utterly visible and widespread economic deprivation. 
Thus, when the narrator first resolves to indulge Bartleby's eccentricities 
(at a point when Barcleby had refused only some, but not all, work, so 
that his crime at this point was insubordination rather than total non-
productivity) the narrator introduces his first egoistic account of his own 
charitable impulse: 
I regarded Barcleby and his ways. Poor fellow! thought I, 
he means no mischief; it is plain he intends no insolence; 
his aspect sufficiently evinces that his eccentricities are 
involuntary. He is useful to me. I can get along with him. 
If I turn him away the chances are he will fall in with 
some less indulgent employer, and then he will be rudely 
treated and perhaps driven forth miserably to starve. Yes. 
Here I can cheaply purchase a delicious self-approval. To 
befriend Bartleby; to humour him in his strange wilful-
ness, will cost me little or nothing, while I lay up in my 
soul what will eventually prove a sweet morsel for my 
conscience.36 
Later in the story, as Bartleby's "eccentricities" become more trying, 
the narrator reintroduces his prudential account of charity, but this time 
as a means of checking his own anger: 
But when this old Adam of resentment rose in me and 
tempted me concerning Bartleby, I grappled him and 
threw him. How? Why, simply by recalling the divine 
injunction: "A new commandment give I unto you, that 
ye love one another." Yes, this it was that saved me. Aside 
from higher considerations, charity often operates as a 
vastly wise and prudent principle - a great safeguard to 
221 
HeinOnline -- 8 Cardozo Stud. L. & Literature 222 1996
its possessor. Men have committed murder for jealousy's 
sake, and anger's sake, and hatred's sake, and selfishness' 
sake, and spiritual pride's sake, but no man that ever I 
heard of, ever committed a diabolical murder for sweet 
charity's sake. Mere self-interest, then, if no better motive 
can be enlisted, should, especially with high-tempered 
men, prompt all beings to charity and philanthropy. At 
any rate, upon the occasion in question, I strove to 
drown my exasperated feelings toward the scrivener by 
benevolently construing his conduct. Poor fellow, poor 
fellow! thought I, he doesn't mean any thing; and besides, 
he has seen hard times, and ought to be indulged.37 
There are, however, limits to sympathy, and limits upon the charita-
ble impulse, particularly in the public world of work, rather than the pri-
vate world of home or worship. The first such limit, of course, is profes-
sional appearances. The narrator is, above all else, he tells us in the first 
paragraph, an eminently safe man, who "from his youth upward, has been 
filled with a profound conviction that the easiest way oflife is the best."38 
And, what this safe man of prudence comes to understand is that his busi-
ness will suffer, and badly, if he continues to indulge Bartleby's unpro-
ductive presence. It is this inescapable fact that finally impresses upon the 
narrator's consciousness the need to restore "normalcy" in his office, and 
eventually spurs him on to more definitive action: 
I believe that this wise and blessed frame of mind would 
have continued with me had it not been for the unso-
licited and uncharitable remarks obtruded upon me by 
my professional friends who visited the rooms. But thus 
it often is, that the constant friction of illiberal minds 
wears out at last the best resolves of the more generous. 
Though to be sure, when I reflected upon it, it was not 
strange that people entering my office should be struck 
by the peculiar aspect of the unaccountable Bartleby, and 
so be tempted to throw out some sinister observations 
concerning him.39 
Perhaps more ominously, the narrator explains, even apart from pru-
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dential concerns of business, there is a "prudential" limit to the sympa-
thetic response itself We quit sympathizing with those in need of our char-
ity where the pain of doing so exceeds the "morsel of self approval" we 
might glean &om the charitable act itself And, we reach that point rather 
quickly when it becomes clear that the object of our charitable impulse is 
failing or refusing to respond in the appropriate and hoped for way: 
Revolving all these things, ... a prudential feeling began 
to steal over me. My first emotions had been those of 
pure melancholy and sincerest pity; but just in propor-
tion as the forlornness of Bartleby grew and grew to my 
imagination, did that same melancholy merge into fear, 
that pity into repulsion. So true it is, and so terrible too, 
that up to a certain point the thought or sight of misery 
enlists our best affections; but, in certain special cases, 
beyond that point it does not. They err who would assert 
that invariably this is owing to the inherent selfishness of 
the human heart. It rather proceeds from a certain hope-
lessness of remedying excessive and organic ill. To a sen-
sitive being, pity is not seldom pain. And when at last it 
is perceived that such pity cannot lead to effectual succor, 
common sense bids the soul be rid of it. What I saw that 
morning persuaded me that the scrivener was the victim 
of innate and incurable disorder. I might give alms to his 
body; but his body did not pain him; it was his soul that 
suffered, and his soul I could not reach.40 
H~ving resolved that Bartleby's needs were spiritual rather than phys-
ical, the narrator more readily reaches the prudential conclusion that nei-
ther moral nor divine law precludes him from barring Bartleby from his 
office. 
The constraint on charity that proves decisive, however, in Bartleby's 
case, is neither economic nor psychological prudence, but, rather, the nar-
rator's consciousness of his own legal entitlement. It is that consciousness 
- a concern that his legal property is threatened by his charitable impulse 
- that cabins his impulse toward charity, and propels him toward his 
repulsion of Bardeby, and it is in this sense that the story "unmasks" the 
role of law and legal rhetoric in the construction of a quite specific con-
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sciousness that legitimates and masks human suffering. In the pivotal psy-
chic action of the story, the narrator makes clear that although the meek 
may indeed someday inherit the earth, he, the narrator, has neither the 
desire nor the intention of allowing them to inherit his part of it. 
Ultimately, it is his own felt entitlement to property that fully checks, and 
trumps, his impulse to charity: 
[A]s the idea came upon me of [Barcleby's] ... possibly 
turning out a long-lived man, and keeping occupying my 
chambers, and denying my authority; and perplexing my 
visitors; and scandalizing my professional reputation; and 
casting a general gloom over the premises; keeping soul 
and body together to the last upon his savings (for doubt-
less he spent but half a dime a day), and in the end per-
haps outlive me, and claim possession of my office by 
right of his perpetual occupancy; as all these dark antici-
pations crowded upon me more and more, and my friends 
continually intruded their relentless remarks upon the 
apparition in my room, a great change was wrought in 
me. I resolved to gather all my faculties together, and for-
ever rid me of this intolerable incubus. 41 
What he could not do, however, was force Barcleby from the 
premises. He simply could not, morally, do something so barbaric: 
What shall I do? What ought I to do? What does con-
science say I should do with this man, or rather ghost? 
Rid myself of him, I must; go, he shall. But how? You will 
not thrust him, the poor, pale, passive mortal, - you will 
not thrust such a -helpless creature out of your door? you 
will not dishonor yourself by such cruelty? No, I will not 
I cannot do that.42 
By force of this reasoning, the narrator is led to his bizarre, somewhat 
pathetic, absurd, but utterly legalistic conclusion: he moves his offices, 
leaving Bartleby on the premises, since he can't bring himself to forcibly 
eject Bartleby from the office. Shortly thereafter, Bartleby is taken to the 
Tombs, where, after preferring not to eat, he dies. 
What to make of this peculiar story? Richard Weisberg, surely the 
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foremost contemporary Melville authority attuned to the complex legal 
and jurisprudential themes so often explored in Melville's fiction, com-
pares " Bartleby" to Billy Budd, Sailor.43 In Bartleby, in Weisberg's judg-
ment, Melville presents simply a gender rendition of the legalistic themes 
explored in more depth in the later story: Bardeby, no less than Billy 
Budd, then, if we spell out the extrapolation, tells the story of a wordy 
lawyer's disingenuous, subtle, and resentful persecution, and ultimately 
destruction, of a non-verbal, paganistic man of paganistic nature. But even 
44 
if one accepts Weisberg's controversial reading of Budd, there's something 
amiss in extending this theme to embrace Bardebyas well. Unlike the char-
acter of Captain Vere in Billy Budd, Sailor, the lawyer in this story of Wall 
Street is for the most part a sympathetically drawn character. He is insight-
ful, somewhat self-deprecatory, generous to his employees, for the most 
part charitable to Bardeby, and charming. He does not have the asocial, 
bookish, twisted, complicated psyche of the "starry-eyed Vere." Unlike 
Vere, he is good company. He does not seem to be filled with ressentiment. 
Nor does he order Bardeby executed, or anything remotely close: the worst 
he does is to stand on his rights, and he does that, ultimately, only after 
first offering to care for Bardeby in his own home. And, to continue the 
contrast, unlike the character of Billy Budd, Bartleby does not exude an 
appealing childlike innocence, or an instinctive talent for peace-making, or 
a natural love of his fellows. Perhaps most tellingly, and in the sharpest 
contrast to "Baby Budd," Bardeby is anything but physically beautiful. He 
is deathly and pale, not joyful and radiant. We are more drawn to the nar-
rator of this tale than we are to Vere, and we are most assuredly more 
repelled by the character of Bardeby than by the portrait of Budd. 
Whatever this story is about, it does not seem to be simply a rehearsal, or 
an echo, of the themes of ressentiment and legal perversion so thoroughly 
explored in Billy Budd, Sailor. 
Brook Thomas' reading, discussed above, seems more convincing: 
Thomas reads Bartleby as in some way about the existence of an alienat-
ed work force brought on by the industrial revolution, and the complici-
ty oflaw, and particularly the common law of contracts and torts, in legit-
imating that alienation. But like Weisberg's, Thomas's reading also 
requires him to depart from the narrative storyline itself As noted above, 
Thomas reads the character of Bartleby as a stand-in, or representative, of 
the existence of an alienated workforce, rather than more simply reading 
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the character as a member of it: 
Allotted machine-like roles, neither the lawyer nor the 
scrivener is a free agent. Nevertheless, they receive 
unequal rewards for fulHlling their tasks. Bartleby's job 
implicitly links him to the world of exploited workers 
produced by the same market system that allows the 
lawyer to live a comfonable life serving the rich. Thus, 
another possible reason for the lawyer's keeping Bartleby 
out of sight is that he is trying to repress his awareness of 
the existence of this repressed labor force .... 
Bartleby shows that the underworld exists within the 
world of Wall Street itself To be sure, that world is pre-
sent in the story before the arrival of Bartleby, in the per-
son of the lawyer's three other employees, but their ulti-
mate submissiveness allows the lawyer to continue to 
repress his awareness of its existence ... Bartleby's eccen-
tricity does not. Hauntingly present, Bartleby becomes a 
bizarre representative of the existence of an underworld 
of workers that the lawyer and his class tried to ignore.45 
Thomas goes on to argue that the story should be understood as, in 
pan, a critique of the displacement of paternalism with a laissez faire tilt 
in tons and contracts, as evidenced by such 19th century inventions as 
the fellow servant rule. I have already discussed one problem, also noted 
by Thomas's critics, with this reading: the actual physical injuries Bartleby 
sustains (if any) have nothing to do with the fellow-servant rule, and the 
more serious psychic injury he endures is surely not the sort of injury that 
might have been compensated under either a more paternalistic under-
standing of master-servant relations or a more regulatory regime govern-
ing the workplace.46 The second problem, however, less noted by 
Thomas's critics, is that by making Bartleby a stand-in, essentially, for fac-
tory workers who were maimed, killed, and grotesquely uncompensated 
by 19th century ton and contract law, Thomas gives the story straight-
forward thematic content, but in so doing has lost sight of its particular-
ity: its focus on the work of copying deeds and trust agreements in a Wall 
Street legal office in the middle of the 19th century. If Melville had want-
ed to write about oppressed factory workers, he surely could have, and in 
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fact did, in a story written right after Bartleby, entitled "The Paradise of 
Bachelors and the Tarturus of Maids." In that story Melville does indeed, 
quite vividly, contrast the luxurious life of lawyers with the hellish condi-
tions of the factories that produce the paper on which the lawyers rely, 
and the women who labor in those factories. But that story is not this one. 
By combining, in a sense, parts of Thomas's reading with Weisberg's 
(implicit) one, we reach, I think, an understanding of the story stronger 
than either standing alone. Weisberg is surely right that this story, like 
Billy Budd, Sailor is about the psyche of the lawyer, and Thomas is surely 
right that the story is in some sense about the exploitation of workers. But 
we don't need to view the "psychic story" as a story of ressentiment, and we 
don't need to view the "exploitation story" as a story about the effect of 
the fellow-servant rule on injured factory workers. In fact to do so renders 
Bartleby peculiarly redundant: Melville explores the theme of ressentiment 
in Billy Budd and, as noted above, explores the exploitation of factory 
workers in "The Paradise of Bachelors and the Tartarus of Maids." Rather, 
the psychic story told in Bartleby is the story of legitimation, not ressenti-
ment. What is driving the narrator in Bartleby is not ressentiment- a jeal-
ous, wordy urge to conquer and displace natural paganistic heroism -
but a need to legitimate his own wealth and position of comparative priv-
ilege. And, the story of exploitation told in Bartleby is the story of the 
exploitation of office workers - workers doing the mechanical work of 
producing copied words which themselves mechanically convert nature 
into property and profit. There is no need to view the office worker as a 
stand-in for the maimed factory worker, injured by a machine for which, 
under the auspices of the fellow-servant rule, the employer need not take 
responsibility. Office work is the subject matter of the story, and the sub-
ject of its implicit political critique. 
Such a reading, I think, preserves the integrity of the narrative, and 
also explains the modern reader's affective attachment and repulsions to 
the characters in the story. The narrator of this story is simply not as evil, 
or as twisted, or as psychically damaged, or, ultimately, as destructive, as 
Captain Vere. The "story" of legitimation, unlike the story of ressentiment, 
is not a story of the viciousness and moral hypocrisy of men of letters. In 
short, we like the narrator of this story - even if he does do a "snug busi-
ness with rich men's bonds and mortgages" - because he's really not such 
a bad guy. Likewise, Bartleby is not an exploited, maimed victimized fac-
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tory worker, nor does he "represent" them. He is who he is - an office 
worker who refuses to be productive, eventually refuses even to accept 
charity, and in short refuses to behave rationally. Our exasperation with 
him, like the narrator's own, is not a pale reflection of the factory owner's 
exploitative failure, sanctioned by the law, to take responsibility for the 
injuries caused by his machines. It is an entirely understandable frustra-
tion over the refusal of someone to play according to a social and politi-
cal script we've all come to accept as relatively unproblemmatic, and in 
any event, more or less inevitable. 
To conclude by stating the obvious - the professional, legal, educat-
ed reader of this story likes and identifies with this narrator - whether 
or not he identifies with Vere - for the simple reason that he so resem-
bles us. We like him because we are like him. Whether or not "we" - the 
professional or educated readers of these stories - suffer from the ressen-
timent that affiicts Vere, we all legitimate our own privilege, and we all do 
so, like the narrator, in part by repressing our awareness of Bartleby's 
physicality, and his need for biological sustenance. There are elements of 
Bartleby's obstinate refusal to produce, to help himself, to stand on his 
own, to even accept help from others, in every panhandler, homeless per-
son, drug addict, chronically underemployed, and mentally deranged per-
son we pass on the street. Their suffering is not a stand-in for the suffer-
ing of more economically exploited factory workers; their suffering is 
their own. And we legitimate it, with the same psychic stratagems 
employed by the narrator: we ascribe to them either free agency or an 
"incurable malady," we insist that the cause of their illness is spiritual 
rather than physical need, we limit our felt capacity for empathy, and 
most of all we police the moral entitlements of the meek by reference to 
the legal entitlements of the propertied, including our own. Whatever the 
meek might inherit, they won't inherit mine, and my charitable reactions 
are cabined accordingly. All of these stratagems feel morally unproblem-
matic when we encounter them in this narrative because they feel so 
utterly familiar; that he employs them makes the narrator nothing worse 
than ordinary. Our identification with and sympathy for the narrator is 
by no means evidence of our own mendacity. 
It is, however, evidence of our own complicity, and it is complicity in 
a system which vigorously legitimates the suffering, and exploitation, of 
wage workers, not only in factories and on farms, but in offices as well. 
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For while the narrator in Bartleby is no villain - as Thomas notes, he is 
no Dickensian evil capitalist - he is also no hero. He does indeed, as 
Thomas insists, lack agency - thereby precluding either heroism or vil-
lainy. His resolution of his moral dilemma - to remove his office from 
Bartleby, since he can't remove Bartleby from his office - is truly comi-
cal: one pictures a small-bodied man, empowered by law but lacking in 
physical strength, literally running down Wall Street, leading a small 
horde of packers and movers carrying furniture, all so as to escape the 
unappealing need to remove an oppressive mentally ill but utterly harm-
less individual from an office building. He also lacks imagination: he can't 
fathom alternative solutions to his problems. 
But what he most lacks, of course, is critical distance from the under-
lying economic and political causes of not only Bartleby's malady, but his 
own as well. He cannot question the deeper premises of a system which 
led him and Bartleby to their point of crisis. He can more easily abandon 
Bartleby than his own consciousness, and his consciousness, structured 
and constrained by legal entitlements, is what (penultimately) points him 
away from common humanity - in the form not only of Bartleby's need, 
but also in the form of his own impulse to care. 
H. A Jury of Her Peers 
"A Jury of Her Peers," or "Trifles," as it was alternatively titled, tells 
the story of the investigation of the murder of a farmer, killed in his sleep 
by a rope around his neck, in the nineteen-teens. The farmer's wife is the 
chief suspect. The story opens as the murder is being investigated inside 
the home, from which the wife has been removed, by the sheriff and the 
prosecutor. The men have brought two women with them: the sheriff's 
wife, Mrs. Peters, and the victim and suspect's neighbor, Mrs. Hale. These 
two women sit in the kitchen and talk while their husbands examine the 
rest of the house for some evidence that might supply a motive with 
which to inculpate the wife in her husband's murder. The women's con-
versation and actions in the kitchen constitute the entire action of the 
story, and the dialogue of the play. 
While sitting in the kitchen the women discover precisely the evi-
dence of motive the men are in search of. Amidst the various "trifles" con-
tained in a kitchen which the men, in their condescending dismissal of 
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women's concerns, overlook, the women find what is for them clear evi-
dence of a severely disturbed and abusive relationship: the kitchen is in 
disarray, the table half cleaned, quilting blocks are oddly and badly sewn 
- all of which, they conclude, evidence domestic work abruptly inter-
rupted. They eventually happen upon the clinching piece of evidence: a 
hidden songbird, who had clearly been wrenched from its cage, and stran-
gled to death. The women reason that the strangled bird had been both 
treasured by the desperately lonely farm wife for its companionship and 
killed at the hands of her husband, and must have been the proverbial last 
straw, prompting the wife to kill her abusive husband. 
They also, however, through the course of their conversation, realize 
that they each (for somewhat different reasons) strongly sympathize and 
identify with the farm wife. The very evidence which, in their husbands' 
eyes, would inculpate the wife - providing the decisive and necessary 
evidence of motive - the women view as exculpatory. This metaphorical 
jury of one's peers metaphorically acquits the farm wife of the murder of 
her husband, finding the homicide either justified or excused. In a cli-
mactic moment of political solidarity with the farm wife, they hide the 
evidence, insuring that she will not be brought to trial. 
Like Melville's "Bartleby," Glaspell's "A Jury of Her Peers" can be read 
as a study of the societal and legal legitimation of human suffering -
legitimation of the suffering caused not, in this case, by the institution of 
wage labor, but rather by the institution of marriage. The story is struc-
turally parallel to "Bartleby" in a number of respects. In "Jury" as in 
"Bartleby," we are given an evocative description of the injury and suffer-
ing brought on by a social institution, which is itself defined by law as 
well as custom. Both stories provide an account of the ways in which law 
legitimates that suffering. Unlike "Bartleby," however, which gives us an 
inside look at the legitimated consciousness of the privileged, "A Jury of 
Her Peers" provides, through the wives' conversation, an examination of 
the legitimated consciousness of the oppressed. What "Jury" provides, 
ultimately, is an account of the ways in which political action between 
oppressed women is frustrated - in large part by the construction of 
individuality implicit in the role of the wife. 
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A. The Injury 
This novella - which for any number of obvious reasons has become 
canonical within the feminist legal community - contains, among much 
else, a particular and highly critical portrayal of the institution of mar-
riage. Through marriage, the story suggests, young girls are separated 
from their communities and families of nurturance, and isolated within 
heterosexual relationships in which they are expected to altruistically sac-
rifice their own needs and subordinate their own wills, and which are 
often - typically? - far less emotionally nourishing than the communi-
ties from which they came. That lack - the absence of emotional nour-
ishment - is severely injurious. Whether or not a marriage is physically 
abusive, a marriage in which a woman's need for intimacy and emotional 
companionship is not met, and which simultaneously severs her from 
sources of emotional nourishment, is profoundly damaging. It entails 
immense amounts of human suffering, most or all of which, like the suf-
fering incident to wage labor, goes entirely unnoticed, unrecognized, and 
uncompensated by the law. 
The injury occasioned by such a marriage in Minnie Foster's life was 
extreme. Minnie Foster, the women's conversation in the kitchen makes 
clear, moved from girlhood to an early marriage to an incommunicative, 
cold man, and more generally, from a life of delight and pleasure to a life 
dominated by loneliness and ugliness. It is that loneliness and ugliness, 
more than any other feature of the marriage, to which Mrs. Hale and 
Mrs. Peters return again and again, in their attempt to make sense of the 
apparent murder that faces them. Thus, in the opening paragraphs, the 
narrator explains that the house itself was lonesome: 
[T]hey had gone up a little hill and could see the Wright 
place now, and seeing it did not make her feel like talk-
ing. It looked very lonesome this cold March morning. It 
had always been a lonesome looking place. It was down 
in a hollow, and the poplar trees around it were lone-
some-looking treesY 
The lonesomeness endured by Minnie Foster in this house (aggravat-
ed by her husband's refusal to install a telephone), was further under-
scored by the ugliness and hardness of life in a home pressed for cash, and 
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without light, liveliness, or delight. Mrs. Hale, the neighbor, comments: 
"Wright was close!" she exclaimed, holding up a shabby 
black skirt that bore the marks of much making over. "I 
think maybe that's why she kept so much to hersel£ I 
s'pose she felt she couldn't do her part; and then, you 
don't enjoy things when you feel shabby. She used to wear 
pretty clothes and be lively - when she was Minnie 
Foster, one of the town girls, singing in the choir. But 
that - oh, that was twenty years ago. "48 
In a similar mode, she comments on the stove: 
How'd you like to cook on this? - pointing with the 
poker to the broken lining. She opened the oven door 
and started to express her opinion of the oven; but she 
was swept into her own thoughts, thinking of what it 
would mean, year after year, to have that stove to wrestle 
with. The thought of Minnine Foster trying to bake in 
that oven - and the thought of her never going over to 
see Minnie Foster -
She was startled by hearing Mrs. Peters say: "A per-
son gets discouraged - and loses heart."49 
The absence of objects of beauty in such a life is an assault on the 
senses, and an injury itsel£ In putting together sewing materials to take to 
Minnie Foster, Mrs. Hale comments: 
"Here's some red," said Mrs. Hale, bringing out a roll of 
cloth. Underneath that was a box. "Here, maybe her scis-
sors are in here - and her things." She held it up. "What 
a pretty box! I'll warrant that was something she had a 
long time ago - when she was a girl. "50 
The grimness of this life - surely bearable if undertaken within a 
companionable marriage - became intolerable when coupled with her 
husband's personality and character. The women repeatedly make the 
point by contrasting Minnie's life before and after her marriage: 
"Not having children makes less work," mused Mrs. 
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Hale .... "but it makes a quiet house - and Wright out 
to work all day - and no company when he did come 
in. Did you know John Wright, Mrs. Peters?" 
Not to know him. I've seen him in town. They say he was 
a good man. 
"Yes - good ... he didn't drink, and kept his word as 
well as most, I guess, and paid his debts. But he was a 
hard man, Mrs. Peters. Just to pass the time of day with 
him -." She stopped, shivered a little. "Like a raw wind 
that gets to the bone." Her eyes fell upon the cage on the 
table before her, and she added, almost bitterly: "I should 
think she would've wanted a bird!" ... 
"She - come to think of it, she was kind of like a 
bird herself Real sweet and pretty, but kind of timid and 
- fluttery. How-she-did-change."sl 
In contemplating the significance of the strangled songbird, both 
Hale and Peters eventually identify and sympathize with the injury occa-
sioned by this forced, quiet, loneliness: 
Mrs. Hale had not moved. "If there had been years and 
years of - nothing, then a bird to sing to you, it would 
be awful - still - after the bird was still ... " 
"I know what stillness is," [Mrs. Peters] said, in a 
queer, monotonous voice. "When we homesteaded in 
Dakota, and my first baby died - after he was two years 
old - and me with no other then - " ... 
"I wish you'd seen Minnie Foster," [Mrs. Hale 
responded] . .. "when she wore a white dress with blue 
ribbons, and stood up there in the choir and sang. "52 
What, exactly, is Minnie Foster's injury? In a rich and informative his-
torical analysis, Marina Angel argues, persuasively, that Susan Glaspell 
was moved to write Jury as a result of a trial on which she had reported as 
a journalist, which involved the murder of a husband by a physically 
abused wife. 53 In an interesting historical inversion, the dominant issue of 
the trial - and in this respect, apparently, the trial was typical - con-
cerned, Angel shows, the prosecutor's attempts to introduce evidence of 
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that abuse so as to provide precisely what was missing in the fictional 
story: evidence of motive. The defendant and loyal family members tried 
just as strenuously to keep evidence of the abusive quality of the marriage 
out - the result being a curious reversal of contemporary tactics. The 
defendant and witnesses would offer sometimes perjured testimony of the 
contentedness of the marriage - to suppon the inference that the murder 
must have been committed by a third party. The prosecutor would try to 
show the abuse. 54 The defendant, and her witnesses, were thus involved in 
precisely the tactics employed by Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters: manipula-
tion and destruction of evidence so as to lead to the false inference at trial 
that the wife lacked a motive for her husband's murder. Angel's historical 
context provides an imponant clue to Glaspell's intended meaning. 
Clearly, Glaspell, as a journalist and feminist, was taken by this pro-
foundly unjust alignment of tactic and end result: to achieve the right 
result, the trial had to be manipulated, illegally, so as to underscore the 
legitimacy of the institution responsible for the woman's suffering. An 
abused woman had to aggressively deny her own abuse - she had to 
wrongly claim she was happily married - in order to win a just result. 
This is, of course, legitimation with a vengeance. Against this historical 
backdrop, ''A Jury of Her Peers" can indeed be seamlessly read as a 
straightforward indictment of a score of sexist and misogynist doctrines 
of law, all of which Angel skillfully lays out. Obviously, it is an indictment 
of the exclusion of women from juries and voting booths (Glaspell was an 
active suffragist). But just as clearly it is an indictment of the system's utter 
hypocrisy: remember, at the same time women were routinely prosecuted 
and convicted for murdering violently abusive husbands, husbands were 
just as routinely released - with no criminal charge whatsoever - for 
murdering adulterous wives. And, just as "Bartleby" can be read, and 
Thomas so reads it, as an indictment of the law's failure to incorporate 
ameliorative doctrines (such as workers' comp) to remove the harsh edges 
of wage labor, so "Jury" can be read, and Angel so reads it, as an indict-
ment of the law's failure to incorporate ameliorative doctrines (such as 
battered spouse syndrome) to mitigate the harshness of patriarchy. As 
Bartleby can be read as a "stand-in" for the more truly oppressed worker, 
so Minnie can be taken as a "stand-in" for the more profoundly injured 
battered spouse. And - it is worth noting - Angel has considerably 
more historical evidence for her abstraction than Thomas has for his: 
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Glaspell really did report on, and dwell on, precisely these cases - cases 
involving what we would today recognize, and "class"ify as, battered 
women who kill. By reading the fictional Minnie as a stand-in for the his-
torically real battered women who killed, the story can be given seamless 
thematic content. On this reading, the evidence Hale and Peters hide is 
evidence of the violent abuse of Minnie Foster by her husband. That is the 
injury she sustained, evidence of which should have exculpated and 
instead it inculpated. Such a trial, and such a system, in which evidence 
of violent abuse disserves rather than serves the interest of the woman 
who kills so as to defend herself against it, quite aggressively, and bald-
facedly, legitimates that violence, and directly legitimates, and masks, the 
inutterable amounts of human suffering it causes. Such a system is aggre-
giously out ofline with fundamental norms of justice, and this story's dra-
matic action reveals it as such. 
There is, however, a problem with Angel's reading, and it parallels the 
problem noted above with Thomas's: it is curiously at odds with the facts 
of the story. The women in the kitchen never explicitly conclude that 
Minnie Foster is violently abused. They never even suggest it. We have no 
more evidence that she has been physically abused than we have of 
Bartleby having been maimed by factory machinery. Again, it is only by 
reading her as a stand-in - a representative - that we can make sense of 
this story as about the sorry legal predicament of battered women who 
killed their abusers at the turn of the century. 
But why make this abstraction? Minnie Foster's own injury is 
described, repeatedly, and convincingly: she's lonely. She's isolated. She 
has no light, liveliness, loveliness, delight, conversation, or companion-
ship in her life, and that is enough to create a living hell. In fact, she is 
enduring a living death in her farmhouse, no less than Bartleby and his 
co-scriveners are enduring a living death at their desks in their work cub-
bies. Her emotional needs for intimacy are as trampled upon by this man, 
and this patriarchal regime that produced him, as Bartleby's physical 
needs for shelter and food are trampled by laissez faire capitalism. We 
don't need to view Minnie as a stand-in for battered women, any more 
than we need read Barcleby as a stand-in for maimed factory workers. The 
injury the story actually depicts - the utter, lonely isolation of an emo-
tionally dead marriage - is bad enough. It is their sympathy for and 
understanding of the sufferance of that injury, I think, which leads Mrs. 
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Hale and Mrs. Peters to hide evidence of it. And, it is the reader's sympa-
thy and understanding of it as well, furthermore, which lead us to believe, 
at least for a moment, that perhaps they were right to do so. 
At any rate, if we at least permit an alternative - and more literal -
reading of this story as being not about the physically abused wife, but 
about the emotional and psychic injury of living in a marriage that is 
empty of emotional succor, a quite different set of meanings emerge. The 
story is not - if we view the injury as emotional rather than physical -
simply a prescient tract for incorporation of a battered spouse syndrome 
defense into the criminal law, or even more broadly, the refusal of the legal 
system to amend itself to incorporate perspectives distinctive to women's 
lives, and thus render it more just. What it is about is the injury done to 
women through the rending of their emotional attachments to their com-
munities - largely female - of origin, and of friendships, and the dis-
placement of those communities with the too-often isolating, cold, and 
non-sustaining relationship of heterosexual marriage. And although the 
story is unambiguously about law, it is not simply about the law's failures 
to incorporate doctrines that would mitigate its harshness in dealing with 
the extreme injuries sustained within these marriages by battered women 
who kill. It is, rather, as I will argue below, about the complicity oflaw in 
constructing the consciousness of privilege and deprivation that render 
such suffering invisible. 
B. The Legitinuztion 
How, then,. is the suffering within abusive marriages, whether the 
abuse is emotional or physical, legitimated? Partly, of course, it is legiti-
mated by brute legal force: a wife who rebels against this suffering by 
killing her husband will be charged with murder, and evidence of his abu-
siveness against her - even if violent, at the time of this story - most 
assuredly will be inculpatory evidence of motive. If Marina Angel is right, 
then the women in this story took an action which at the time was not 
unheard of: family and friends of women accused of killing their hus-
bands often conspired among themselves to keep evidence of the abusive 
character of the slain spouse out of the trial. Such evidence would help, 
not hurt, the prosecution by supplying a motive. Likewise, the exclusion 
of women from juries quite brutally and forcibly legitimated the exclusion 
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from the public consciousness of the awareness of the obvious fact that 
constant abuse, belittlement, and condescension, can indeed drive some-
one to kill. Exclusion of women from juries and from public life in gen-
eral barred from public consciousness awareness of the overwhelming 
hypocrisy in allowing knowledge of a wife's adultery to constitute, in any 
number of jurisdictions, a full defense to a husband's murder of his wife, 
while even physical abuse of the wife by the husband constituted incul-
patory evidence of motive, rather than exculpatory evidence of justifica-
tion and excuse. In a system so blatantly skewed, it was inevitable that 
women would and did hide evidence, in precisely the manner of Mrs. 
Hale and Mrs. Peters, and as recorded, both journalistically and in fiction, 
by Susan Glaspell. 
i\ Jury of Her Peers" was certainly intended to be read as, and cer-
tainly should be read as, a condemnation of this exclusionary unfairness. 
Nevertheless, the novella is not only a tract for women's equality, nor for 
battered spouse defenses, nor for women's participation on juries -
although it is most assuredly in part all of these. Like "Bartleby," what this 
story vividly records is not so much the forced oppression of a class of 
people by law, but their ideological oppression by a cultural system of 
meanings, and in the construction of which, law is at most complicit. But 
whereas " Bartleby" chronicles the system of meanings which cabin and 
constrain the charitable instincts of the powerful, "Jury" chronicles the 
system of meanings which cabin and constrain and frustrate the political 
consciousness of the weak. What "Jury" is about are the formidable obsta-
cles - overwhelmingly ideological and psychic - confronting the polit-
ical act ultimately taken by Mrs. Peters and Mrs. Hale. The act of defi-
ance and solidarity taken by these two women is as difficult and "unnat-
ural" for them as is the act of charity for the narrator in "Bartleby." What 
the novella does is provide a descriptive account of the women's state of 
mind, which might explain why this is so. 
What are those obstacles? What is the content of the "false con-
sciousness" of the oppressed, which renders their acquiescence so seem-
ingly natural and voluntary? As suggested by the title of the play -
"Trifles" - on which the novella is based, the women have indeed to 
some extent internalized the trivialization of their interests, concerns and 
perspectives so consistently voiced by the men in the story. The sheriff 
and county prosecutor in "Jury" - the only male characters - are indeed 
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two-dimensional, as male students who read the work at least in my "Law 
and Literature" class invariably complain, but their habitual belittlement, 
negation, bantering abuse, and condescension of their wives and female 
neighbors is surely not unfamiliar to even modern readers. This bantering 
abuse takes its toll - if you hear it often enough, you do begin to believe 
it. And these women hear it, Glaspell makes clear, relentlessly. It is as pre-
sent to them as the air they breathe. 
But on the other hand, we shouldn't make too much of it - the 
women themselves do not. Interestingly, the women's response to their 
own belittlement from the men they marry is ambiguous. Sometimes the 
women's comments and their self-reflections do echo it, evidencing a 
badly diminished self-concept. At other times, however, they clearly resist 
it, gaining strength from each other in so doing: 
The sheriff ... looked all around ... "Nothing here but 
kitchen things," he said with a little laugh for the 
insignificance of kitchen things. 
The county attorney was looking at the cupboard -
a peculiar ungainly structure ... As if its queerness 
attracted him, he got a chair and opened the upper part 
and looked in. After a moment he drew his hand away 
sticky. 
"Here's a nice mess," he said resentfully. 
The two women had drawn nearer, and now the 
sheriff's wife spoke. 
"Oh - her fruit," she said, looking to Mrs. Hale for 
sympathetic understanding. She turned back to the 
county attorney and explained: "She worried about that 
when it turned so cold last night. She said the fire would 
go out and her jars might burst." 
Mrs. Peter's husband broke into a laugh. 
"Well, can you beat the women! Held for murder, and 
worrying about her preserves!" 
* * * * * 
"Oh, well," said Mrs. Hale's husband, with good natured 
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superiority, "women are used to worrying over trifles." 
The two women moved a little closer together. 
Neither of them spoke. The county attorney seemed sud-
denly to remember his manners - and think of his 
future. 
''And yet," said he, ... "for all their worries, what 
would we do without the ladies?" 
The women did not speak, did not unbend. He went 
to the sink and began washing his hands. He turned to 
wipe them on the roller towel - whirled it for a cleaner 
place. 
"Dirty towels! Not much of a housekeeper, would 
you say, ladies?" 
... "There's a great deal of work to be done on a 
farm," said Mrs. Hale stiffiy .... "Those towels get dirty 
awful quick. Men's hands aren't always as clean as they 
might be." 
''Ah, loyal to your sex, I see," he laughed ... 55 
The men's attitude toward their wives and toward women's work 
accounts for their own obtuseness, but it does not entirely account for the 
women's difficulty in forming common cause with Minnie Foster. Of far 
greater importance, at least in Mrs. Hale's mind, was the physical and 
emotional isolation of each woman from every other. Mrs. Hale returns 
to this isolation - this failure, or inability, on the part of the women to 
sustain a community among themselves - again and again, and she 
returns to this theme, throughout the story, with increasing degrees of 
remorse. She first comments on it in a fairly matter-of-fact tone: 
Time and time again it had been in her mind, "I ought 
to go over and see Minnie Foster" - she still thought of 
her as Minnie Foster, though for twenty years she had 
been Mrs. Wright. And then there was always something 
to do and Minnie Foster would go from her mind. 56 
Later, she ascribes her reluctance to visit Minnie to the cheerlessness of 
the household, although for at this point no clearly articulated reason. By 
this point, she is uncomfortable with the insight, and she refrains from 
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discussing the point in the presence of the men: 
"But you and Mrs. Wright were neighbors. 1 suppose you 
were &iends, too." 
Martha Hale shook her head. 
"I've seen little enough of her of late years. I've not 
been in this house - it's more than a year." 
"And why was that? You didn't like her?" 
"1 liked her well enough," she replied with spirit. 
"Farmers' wives have their hands full, Mr. Henderson. 
And then -" she looked around the kitchen . 
... "It never seemed a very cheerful place," said she, 
more to herself than to him. 
"No," he agreed; "1 don't think anyone would call it 
cheerful. 1 shouldn't say she had the home-making 
instinct. " 
"Well, 1 don't know as Wright had, either," she mut-
tered. 
"You mean they didn't get on very well?" he was 
quick to ask. 
"No, 1 don't mean anything," she answered ... "But 1 
don't think a place would be any the cheerfuller for John 
Wright's bein' in it. "57 
Later, when the men have left the room, she explains in more detail 
her own motives and her own regret for having abandoned Minnie Foster, 
to Mrs. Peters: 
"But 1 tell you what 1 do wish, Mrs. Peters. 
1 wish 1 had come over here sometimes when she was 
here. 1 wish - 1 had . 
. .. 1 stayed away because it weren't cheerful - and 
that's why 1 ought to have come. 1 ... never liked this 
place. Maybe because it's down in a hollow and you don't 
see the road. 1 don't know what it is, but it's a lonesome 
place, and always was. 1 wish 1 had come over to see 
Minnie Foster sometimes. 1 can see now - " She did not 
put it into words. 58 
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Eventually, she suggests a more ominous reason for her reluctance to 
involve herself - her suspicion that Foster's problems are not altogether 
different from her own. By this point, almost at the end of the story, she 
is clearly panicked and guilt ridden by her belated recognition of her 
neglect of her one-time friend: 
The picture of that girl, the fact that she had lived neigh-
bor to that girl for twenty years, and had let her die for 
lack of life, was suddenly more than she could bear. 
"Oh, I wish I'd come over here once in a while!" she 
cried. "That was a crime! That was a crime! Who's going 
to punish that?" 
"I might' a known she needed help! I tell you, it's 
queer, Mrs. Peters. We live close together, and we live far 
apart. We all go through the same things - its all just a 
different kind of the same thing! If it weren't - why do 
you and I understantP. Why do we know - what we 
know this minute?"59 
The women in Jury are reluctant to act in solidarity and on the basis 
of their knowledge because of their sense of the futility of political effort 
- the sheer weight of the given. "The law's the law," Mrs. Peters repeat-
edly reminds Mrs. Hale - even if, as Mrs. Hale retorts, "A bad stove's a 
bad stove." 
The major obstacle, however, facing the women's groping attempts 
toward solidarity with Minnie Foster is ultimately voiced by the men. 
Each woman is isolated from every other, not only by physical distance, 
but through the legally created and perpetuated institution of marriage 
itself, and the state of mind that it inculcates. Mrs. Peters in particular is 
continually described as a sheriff's wife - even if, as Mrs. Hale opines at 
the outset of the story, she doesn't quite look the part. "Of course, Mrs. 
Peters is one of us," the county attorney remarks, "in a manner of entrust-
ing responsibility."6O 
At the dramatic climax of the story, the county attorney returns to the 
matter of Mrs. Peters's legal status, driving the point home. The women 
watch in fascinated, suspended horror as he narrowly avoids accidentally 
uncovering the hidden dead bird, while ~e explains his reasons for not 
feeling the need to examine with any care the items the women have gath-
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ered to take to the accused farm wife. Part of the reason is the trust he 
places in Mrs. Peters, as a representative of the law: 
"No, Mrs. Peters doesn't need supervising. For that mat-
ter, a sheriff's wife is married to the law. Ever think of it 
that way, Mrs. Peters?" ... Mrs. Peters had turned away. 
When she spoke, her voice was muffied. 
"Not - just that way," she said. 
"Married to the law!" chuckled Mrs. Peters' husband.61 
The county attorney is surely right. It is precisely her "marriage to the 
law" and the law's marriage to patriarchy - not simply a falsely dimin-
ished view of herself - that keeps her loyal to him and his sex, rather 
than Minnie Foster and her suffering. The function of law, in this story, 
is not only to hypocritically and unequally punish Minnie Foster for the 
justified or excusable murder of her husband, where it would not have 
punished a cuckolded man. The function of law is to validate, through 
the institution of marriage, the isolation of women from each other. 
IlL Conclusion: Breaking Away 
Neither of these stories is tragic. "A Jury of Her Peers," in fact, ends 
somewhat triumphantly: the two women do ultimately join forces with 
each other and in solidarity with Minnie Foster, protecting her from her 
legal fate. Throughout the story, at each moment of dawning compre-
hension of the commonness of their fate, the women's eyes meet in recog-
nition, bringing them the physical proximity to each other that their own 
marriages have torn asunder. As they first acknowledge the unevenness of 
Minnie Wright's sewing - and the import of that sewing - their eyes 
meet: 
"The sewing" said Mrs. Peters, in a troubled way. ''All the 
rest of them have been so nice and even - but - this 
one. Why, it looks as if she didn't know what she was 
about!" 
Their eyes met - something flashed to life, passed 
between them; then, as if with an effort, they seemed to 
pull away from each other. A moment Mrs. Hale sat 
there, her hands folded over that sewing which was so 
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unlike all the rest of the sewing. Then she had pulled a 
knot and drawn the threads. 
"Oh, what are you doing, Mrs. Hale?" asked the 
sheriff's wife, startled. 
"Just pulling out a stitch or two that's not sewed very 
good," said Mrs Hale, mildly.62 
Similarly, when they first find the broken door of the birdcage, their 
eyes meet in recognition: 
"Look at this door," [Mrs. Peters] said slowly. "It's broke. 
One hinge has been pulled apart." 
Mrs. Hale came nearer. 
"Looks as if some one must have been - rough with 
. " It. 
Again their eyes met - startled, questioning, appre-
hensive. For a moment neither spoke nor stirred. Then 
Mrs. Hale, turning away, said brusquely: 
"If they're going to find any evidence, I wish they'd 
be about it. I don't like this place. "63 
When they discover the dead bird, the same action is repeated: 
The sheriff's wife again bent closer. 
"Somebody wrung its neck," said she, in a voice that 
was slow and deep. 
And then again the eyes of the two women met - this 
time clung together in a look of dawning comprehension, 
of growing horror. Mrs. Peters looked from the dead bird 
to the broken door of the cage. Again their eyes met. 64 
And finally, when the women act in joint conspiracy, their eyes actu-
ally seem to direct their physical actions: 
Again - for one final moment - the two women were 
alone in that kitchen. 
Martha Hale sprang up, her hands tight together, 
looking at that other woman, with whom it rested. At 
first she could not see her eyes, for the sheriff's wife had 
not turned back since she turned away at that suggestion 
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of being married to the law. But now Mrs. Hale made her 
turn back. Her eyes made her turn back. Slowly, unwill-
ingly, Mrs. Peters turned her head until her eyes met the 
eyes of the other woman. There was a moment when they 
held each other in a steady, burning look, in which there 
was no evasion nor flinching. Then Martha Hale's eyes 
pointed the way to the basket in which was hidden the 
thing that would make certain the conviction of the 
other woman - that woman who was not there and yet 
who had been there with them all through that hour .... 
There was the sound of a knob turning in the inner 
door. Martha Hale snatched the box from the sheriff's 
wife, and got it in the pocket of her big coat just as the 
sheriff and the county attorney came back into the 
ki h 65 tc en .... 
In recognition of the women's triumph, the story ends almost comi-
cally, affirming both the political solidarity, but also the secrecy and com-
monality of women's shared labor. Referring to an earlier conversation in 
which the men had mocked the women's interest in Minnie's quilting, 
and more specifically in what quilting technique she might have intend-
ed for the completion of the unfmished project, the county attorney asks: 
"Well, Henry," ... "at least we found out that she was not 
going to quilt it. She was going to - what is you call it, 
I d· ~" ales. 
Mrs. Hale's hand was against the pocket of her coat. 
"We call it - knot it, Mr. Henderson."66 
'Bardeby" as well- although a much sadder story - ends on a note 
of solidarity, which has also been foreshadowed in earlier scenes. In fact, 
throughout the story, the narrator has moments of acting against the 
script of arms length contractual behavior, just as Hale and Peters have 
moments of acting against the script of obsequious wifely submissiveness. 
The narrator's moments of sympathy for Bardeby, and his feeling of com-
mon brotherhood with him, although invariably short-lived, are seem-
ingly genuine. Upon discovering that the unproductive scrivener has also 
become a tenant, after registering shock, the narrator remarks sympathet-
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ically upon his poverty, his loneliness and his manifest misery: 
What miserable friendlessness and loneliness are here 
revealed! His poverty is great; but his solitude, how hor-
rible! Think of it ... here Bartleby makes his home ... 
For the first time in my life a feeling of overpowering 
stinging melancholy seized me. Before I had never expe-
rienced aught but a non-unpleasing sadness. The bond of 
a common humanity now drew me irresistibly too 
gloom. A fraternal melancholy! For both I and Bartleby 
were sons of Adam. I remembered the bright silks and 
sparkling faces I had seen that day, in gala trim, swan-like 
sailing down the Mississippi of Broadway; and I con-
trasted them with the pallid copyist, and thought to 
myself, Ah, happiness courts the light, so we deem the 
world is gay; but misery hides aloof, so we deem that mis-
ery there is none. These sad fancyings ... led on to other 
and more special thoughts, concerning the eccentricities 
of Bartleby. Presentiments of strange discoveries hovered 
round me. The scrivener's pale form appeared to me laid 
out, among uncaring strangers, in its shivering winding 
sheet.67 
To what modern use might these stories be put? They remind us, 
minimally, of "the misery that hides aloof," and guard against the temp-
tation to conclude that "misery there is none." In addition, they guard 
against a quite specific and specifically modern tendency - and tempta-
tion - to validate and legitimate suffering by denying the existence of 
large groups of victims. I am thinking here not of the "blame the victim" 
excesses of the modern political right, but of modern liberatory discours-
es, and particularly, the writings of a number of modern feminists, who 
urge feminists generally to eschew the focus on women's victimization 
which has unquestionably been at the core, historically, of virtually all 
strands of 20th century feminism. To insistently describe women as "vic-
tims," victimized by their common conditions, we are told, is to deny 
each individual in that group "agency," to demean her in her uniqueness, 
to insult her self-possession, awareness and autonomy, and to deny her 
felt freedoms.68 But what if there are, in fact, just such victims, who have, 
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in fact, little if any autonomy, no sense of self-possession, and no "agency" 
to speak of, beyond the false freedom to deny their own victimization? If 
so, then there are groups of women suffering who possess neither heroism 
nor villainy but are rather, and simply, victims, and if so, then our refusal 
to see, discuss, or relieve that victimization is complicity, and it is a com-
plicity against which we should be on guard. 
Tort, contract, criminal law and constitutional law, despite their pur-
ported aim of relieving harm, do little to remind us of the presence of 
such victims among us, and in fact, their legitimating discourses do much 
to worsen the problem. Oddly, it is now fiction - including the stories of 
Bartleby and Minnie Foster - that can most strikingly remind us of the 
presence of real victims - non-heroic, non-villainous, real people suffer-
ing serious but invisible injury. In a curious inversion, we now increas-
ingly demand of actors in true legal dramas either villainy or heroism -
or at a minimum, true agency- and can only turn to narrative fiction-
what in our childhood was our well from which we drew stories of hero-
ism, with which to relieve the doldrums of blandness and ambiguities of 
real life - for depictions of the real suffering of those who have been ren-
dered invisible by the silencing and fictional legitimating discourses of 
law. "Bartleby" and "Trifles" remind us of the presence and reality of 
human beings - neither heros nor villains, and neither free nor in chains 
- suffering the burden of institutions legitimated by the Rule of Law we 
hold so dear. 
"Bartleby" and "Trifles" remind modern readers as well, of course, of 
possibility: the possibility of breaking free of those bonds of complicity. 
Moments between women, in which women truly look at each other 
without "evasion or flinching" are rare, even in fiction, and certainly in 
law. Moments of true charity, of true "fraternal melancholy," in which the 
strong, like the narrator, offer food and shelter to the weak, are rarer still. 
But they do occur, and they occur in each of these stories: the narrator's 
charity in "Bartleby" is cabined by his sense of his own legal entitlement, 
but he nevertheless behaves charitably at the end of the day: he offers 
Bartleby the shelter of his own home, and the warmth of his own 
embrace, although both offers come too late. Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters 
do forge a common cause with Minnie Foster, despite being married to 
the law. These moments do not seem to be particularly transcendent, or 
fantastic; they seem quite realistic, even familiar. "Bartleby" does in the 
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end serve, as Brook Thomas argues, to make the forces of legitimation 
that constrain the narrator's responses and validate his capitalist privilege 
seem strange, and indefensible. But it does more: it also serves to make 
the moment of common humanity seem familiar, and even inevitable. 
"Trifles" likewise does serve, as Marina Angel argues, to render the legiti-
mation of marital violence foreign and unjust. But it too does more: it 
makes the moment of common cause, albeit fleeting, utterly recognizable. 
It is in the end a relief when the narrator finally recognizes Bartleby's 
humanity, and it is a a relief when Mrs. Hale and Mrs. Peters act in con-
cert on Minnie Foster's behalf Both stories remind their reader of our 
recognition of that common bond and that common purpose. And both 
do so against the considerable weight of legal habit - both the charac-
ters' habits and our own. 
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